Immigration: Policy vs. Public Opinion

Kimberly Twist
University of California, Berkeley
December 31, 2012

Department of Homeland Security – Grant No. 2008-ST-061-BS0002

"This research was supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security through the National Center for Border Security and Immigration under grant number 2008-ST-061-BS0002. However, any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Department of Homeland Security."
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results/Findings</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations/challenges</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy recommendations</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next steps in research</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works cited</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

The American public consistently expresses preferences for lower levels of immigration, and harsher sanctions in dealing with illegal immigration. Yet, policy has not moved in the direction of public preferences. Why does the gap between public opinion on immigration and immigration policy exist in the United States, and why does the gap not exist in Western Europe in the same way?

These theories do not explain differences in policy when the inputs (type of electoral system, cost/benefit distribution, and so on) are similar, as in the case of the US and the United Kingdom. I draw on these two countries’ changes in policy and trends in public opinion to propose another theory, one focusing on the strategic behavior of political elites. I argue there are two reasons for the American gap: the lack of a sizeable anti-immigration voting bloc, and the presence of a pro-immigration voting bloc targeted by Republicans. A common assumption is that, given the US two-party system, there is not significant electoral pressure (in the form of a far right party) on the Republicans to take a more anti-immigration stance. By comparing the US and the United Kingdom, I demonstrate that even without a strong anti-immigration party, the mainstream right will still adopt this stance, provided there is enough electoral incentive to do so.

Introduction

(description of project/background, research questions, research methodology, NIS and other data sources employed - no more than 5 pages)

The American public consistently expresses preferences for lower levels of immigration, and harsher sanctions in dealing with illegal immigration. Yet, policy has not moved in the direction of public preferences. Why does the gap between public opinion on immigration and immigration policy exist in the United States, and why does the gap not exist in Western Europe in the same way?

The prominent theory put forth to explain the gap between policy and public opinion is that of Gary Freeman (1995). Freeman sees immigration politics as a type of client politics, with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. The benefits (inexpensive labor) go to a small group of business owners, while the societal costs are widespread, which gives rise to a collective action problem: People might oppose immigration, but organizing to fight the status quo is extraordinarily difficult. Other theories include those of the globalization school (e.g. Sassen 1996), who argue that states have less control over their borders than they did in the past, and the idea that people are anti-immigration until a human face is put on the vague “immigrant” (Ellermann 2006).

These theories do not explain differences in policy when the inputs (type of electoral system, cost/benefit distribution, and so on) are similar, as in the case of the US and the United Kingdom. I draw on these two countries’ changes in policy and trends in public opinion to propose another theory, one focusing on the strategic behavior of political elites. I argue there are two reasons for the American gap: the lack of a sizeable anti-immigration voting bloc, and the presence of a pro-immigration voting bloc targeted by Republicans. A common assumption is that, given the US two-party system, there is not significant electoral pressure (in the form of a far right party) on the Republicans to take a more anti-immigration stance. By comparing the US and the United Kingdom, I
demonstrate that even without a strong anti-immigration party, the mainstream right will still adopt this stance, provided there is enough electoral incentive to do so.

In this paper, I first consider how immigration policy has evolved since the 1980s in the United States and the United Kingdom, and then demonstrate the policy and opinion disconnect through an overview of opinion polls in the US and Western Europe. Next, I use existing survey data (from the British Election Study, European Values Survey, World Values Survey, and European Social Survey, as well as the New Immigrant Survey, Latino National Survey, and National Asian American Survey) and new experimental data to show that immigration is of greater importance to the British public than it is to the American public. I then explore the unique appeal of pro-immigration voters to the mainstream right in the United States and consider the role anti-immigration political pressure can play in the US (and does play in Europe). I conclude with policy implications and future extensions.

Results/Findings

Immigration policy changes

Illegal immigration tends to take center stage in American political debates on immigration, though legal immigration (particularly skilled-labor visas) has also been on the agenda since the 1980s. In Western Europe, legal immigration has been the focus, but illegal immigration and asylum are also prominent topics. While there have been many bills debated, I focus here on national legislation related to immigration passed in the US and the UK since the 1980s. Interestingly, some of the more restrictive policies in the US have been passed by Democrats.

A legislative amnesty for illegal immigrants who entered the US before 1982, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act made hiring illegal immigrants a crime. Present-day members of the anti-immigration wing of the Republican Party invoke this legislation as a mistake not to be repeated, though it was passed under Ronald Reagan. Four years later, the 1990 Immigration Act upped the total annual immigration limit to 700,000 (previously 500,000) and reclassified the visa system, giving priority to workers with needed skills; the high-skill (H-1B) visa quotas were increased again in 2000. The existing Immigration and Nationality Act (1952) was modified by Congress in 1994 to allow people already in the country to adjust their immigration status once their visa became available by paying a $1000 fine. Previously, leaving the US was required for the adjustment of immigration status.

Two immigration-related bills were passed in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The latter affected immigrants by reducing the amount of welfare benefits available to them (some of which were returned under the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998), while the former specified how long illegal immigrants must remain outside the US before applying for re-entry after deportation. IIRIRA also piloted a federal employment verification system.

Since IRCA in 1986, which legalized nearly three million illegal immigrants, several other major amnesties were passed (legalizing as many as an additional two million individuals). Some of these, such as the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (2000), passed with Republican modifications that did not drastically water down the content. As a result of September 11, 2001, immigrants serving in the military were made eligible for immediate citizenship. Most recently, President Obama signed an executive order in June 2012 halting deportation for people under thirty who came to the US illegally as children (prior to age 16), provided they have been in the US for at least five years, have not committed any major criminal offenses, and have a US high school diploma.
(or GED) or have served in the armed forces. Under his administration, however, deportations have been at near-historic levels.

In the UK, the first major legislation of this period was the 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, the impact of which was to dramatically increase the number of refused claims. Three years later, the list of “safe countries” – countries passed through between one’s home country and one’s destination, where it would have been reasonable to apply for asylum – was expanded, further reducing the number of applications for asylum. Although Labour wanted to repeal some of these provisions, once in office, Tony Blair’s home secretary (Jack Straw) took steps to make asylum less attractive in the UK, such as moving from cash payments to a voucher system, under the Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999. The vouchers were stopped under the 2002 Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill, which did increase the punishments for smuggling illegal immigrants into the UK.

Prime Minister Blair announced plans for a tiered visa system in 2005, which took effect three years later. Points were awarded for necessary skills, English ability, and financial security. After the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition entered government in 2010, the number of visas granted under this system to non-EU foreigners was slashed. Proposals discussed for the remainder of the government’s tenure include instituting minimum income thresholds for anyone wanting to sponsor a relative to come to the UK and English-language requirements for potential foreign students.

While American politicians are trying to appear both tough on illegal immigration and compassionate toward children brought to the US illegally, British politicians are seemingly trying to out-do their opponents with strong restrictive stances. In December 2012, Labour leader Ed Miliband announced his party’s willingness to cap immigration and require civil servants to pass English-language tests (Hodges 2012).

Opinion trends over time

Looking at opinion polls about immigration, we see that the American public is not dramatically different from most Western European publics in its aggregate-level opinions, nor has it been over the past thirty years. Crucially for this paper, the levels of US and UK opinion are reasonably consistent during this time. The five charts below show the percentage of respondents in each country indicating that they would not want to have an immigrant as a neighbor (with the US highlighted in red).

---

Figure 1A: Would not want to have an immigrant as a neighbor (%), 1981

Figure 1B: Would not want to have an immigrant as a neighbor (%), 1990
Figure 1C: Would not want to have an immigrant as a neighbor (%), 1994-98

Figure 1D: Would not want to have an immigrant as a neighbor (%), 1999
Consistent issue attitudes over a period of time are more likely to lead to policy change than are short bursts of opinion (Fetzer 2011: 14). This is the situation in the US with respect to immigration. Yet, what these (and other) polls often overlook is the importance of immigration as a voting issue for citizens. Even if strong majorities are in favor of cutting numbers of immigrants, cracking down on illegal immigration, and so forth, politicians are unlikely to act accordingly unless these anti-immigration opinions are translated into votes. A main contention of this paper is that mainstream politicians behave strategically: If taking anti-immigration positions will help them be (re)elected, they will do so. This simple proposition gives us enormous traction for explaining why British politicians – on the right, but also some from the left – propose and carry out more restrictive immigration changes than do American politicians. The divergence and resulting strategic behavior come from two sources: immigration is a higher-priority issue among British citizens than among American citizens, and the American mainstream right believes it stands to benefit from a softer stance on immigration in a way the British mainstream right does not. In this section, I explore the first explanation; the second follows in the next section.

Politicians on the American right may not be strictly ‘single-minded re-election seekers’ (Mayhew 1974), but it stands to reason that they would adopt a more restrictive position on immigration if they felt it would be beneficial to them. It is true that the US Republican party unites diverse interests, but this is common for parties in majoritarian systems (where two major parties are standard). Republicans representing the pro-business wing of the party should be expected to be less anti-immigration; business has long favored the inexpensive labor brought by immigration. This business faction is also part of the British Conservatives, however, and thus cannot explain the divergence between policy and opinion.

In 2010, nearly one-quarter of British respondents listed immigration as the top concern in their country, compared to just nine percent of Americans (Transatlantic Trends 2010). The
opposition to immigration in the UK has been present since, at least, surveys began asking questions about immigration in the late 1960s (Blinder 2012: 3).

Over the period (2000-present) where questions about immigration have been asked at least once every year, the proportion of people in the US wanting to decrease immigration has dropped, with “keep present level” overtaking “decrease” in 2012 (Gallup Poll). Yet, for example, more people continue to say they worry a “great deal” about illegal immigration than say they worry some or not at all (Figures 2 and 3, below).

Figure 2: Preferences for level of immigration (%) – source, Gallup Poll
Most people, if asked, will say they think immigration is a problem. Few people, however, care enough about immigration – when compared to issues like taxes and unemployment – to cast their vote based on a candidate’s stance on immigration. I designed a survey experiment to test whether disagreeing with a (hypothetical) candidate’s position on immigration was powerful enough to overcome the traditional US partisan loyalties. I expected that most voters would stick with their preferred party’s candidate, regardless of that candidate’s position on immigration, provided they did not object to the candidate’s position on issues of (expected) greater importance, such as the economy. This is, indeed, what I found, in line with existing studies. Lenz (2009) finds that individuals will follow their party’s position once they see a given message with a party cue attached. Relatedly, Carsey and Layman (2006) argue that someone aware of party differences on an issue they find salient should pick the party that best conforms to their own opinion, whereas someone who does not care as much about that issue should fall in line with whatever position his party takes.

In this experiment, all respondents saw three policy statements – one on immigration, one on taxes, and one on higher education. The latter two policies were constant for all subjects, and pre-tested on a different sample to ensure they were policies with moderate levels of support. The immigration statement was tailored to each respondent – partisan identifiers (including leaners) saw a statement intended to generate opposition. The statement shown to Republicans proposed amnesties for illegal immigrants, while the statement shown to Democrats proposed eliminating automatic granting of citizenship for children of illegal immigrants born in the United States. Independents received one of these two statements at random. Both statements produced a strong majority in opposition. On top of this tailored treatment, each of the three partisan groups received one of three candidate prompts, providing either no party identification, or saying the candidate in question was a Republican/Democrat.

Table 1 shows respondents’ mean position on the immigration policy of the candidate, broken down by partisan identifiers (independents are omitted, due to the small sample sizes). The averages are not statistically different from one another, even when comparing across party, but it is interesting to note that in-party candidates’ positions were rated slightly less favorably than were out-party candidates’ (higher numbers represent more opposition). This pattern did not hold for in-party vs. out-party comparisons on the other two issues (though, again, the differences were not
This suggests that an in-party candidate taking a disliked position generates less opposition than does an out-party candidate taking an – expected – disliked position (in contrast to Cohen 2003).

Table 1: Mean opinion on candidate’s immigration position, by partisan cues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-party</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>3.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-party</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No party</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 321 respondents, 58 (18 percent) said they were unlikely or very unlikely to support the candidate. We may be able to explain some of this through party identification – four-fifths of these people were not presented with a candidate from their party. This leaves us with twelve respondents who received an in-party cue (Republicans who saw a Republican candidate, or Democrats who saw a Democratic candidate). Eleven of the twelve disliked the in-party candidate’s position on immigration, compared to seven dislikes of the tax position and three of the education position. While there are not many people who disliked the in-party candidate, these numbers are still suggestive of the power of immigration for a small percentage of people. This group is not confined to one party – five of the twelve were Republicans, and seven were Democrats. As we might expect, neither party has a real-life monopoly on people who care about immigration, though, of course, the Republicans who care deeply hold different preferences than do the Democrats.

The three policy evaluations – immigration, taxes, and (higher) education – are all significant predictors of the outcome variable, likely support for the fictitious candidate. With only three pieces of information, this is not surprising; we would expect respondents to use all of these pieces in forming their impression of the candidate. Yet, immigration opinions, on average, drive the overall candidate evaluation less strongly than do the other policy areas. A one-point change in opinion on the immigration position (e.g. agree to strongly agree) moves the candidate evaluation 0.21 points on the five-point scale. Comparable changes in taxes and education opinion move the candidate opinion 0.41 and 0.48 points, respectively.

We can see the differential impact of these policy areas more clearly when we consider the difference between someone saying they disapprove (somewhat or strongly) and someone who either approves or takes a middle position. Moving from “not disapproving” to “disapproving” of the immigration position decreases candidate evaluations by 0.3 points on the five-point scale. Similar shifts in opinion about the tax position decreases candidate support by 1.21 points, and about education, 1.53 points. These differences would take someone from, for example, “likely to support”, to somewhere between a “neither likely nor unlikely to support” and “unlikely to support” – in effect, a reversal of position.

Table 2, below, shows the mean candidate evaluation for respondents who agree with a given position and respondents who disagree (where a 1 is “very likely to support candidate” and 5 is “very unlikely to support candidate.”) All of these average evaluations are statistically significant, when comparing agree to disagree, but the magnitude for immigration is striking compared to the other two issues. The evaluations for taxes and education flip from positive to negative when we compare respondents who agree with the position and respondents who do not.

Table 2: Mean candidate evaluation by issue area and respondents’ opinion of that issue position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These findings are all the more striking when we consider that many voters are unaware of candidates’ positions on various issues, instead relying on party cues to make their voting decision (particularly for positions other than the president). A voter would have to care a great deal about immigration to seek information about candidates’ stances on immigration, and then have this information influence their vote. In the next section, I explore the subset of voters who both care about immigration and take a pro-immigration stance; we should expect these voters to know where the parties stand on immigration.

The role of pro-immigration voters

United States

About eighty percent of those surveyed in the 2003 New Immigrant Survey six- and twelve-month pilot studies indicated they planned to apply for citizenship in the future; it is probable that a number of these individuals have done so or will soon do so (NIS 2003). We do not, unfortunately, know how these recent immigrants feel about various political issues, or which party they might support, but there are other existing national surveys on which we can draw for some help.

According to the 2006 Latino National Survey, 64 percent of Latinos living in the US support the Democrats, compared to 23 percent for the Republicans. These groups’ demographic differences (age, level of education, etc.) are not statistically significant, but their opinions on illegal immigration are. Republican Latinos, while not anti-immigrant, are still less likely to support amnesty proposals and the DREAM Act. Asian Americans are more likely than Latinos to offer a party they support, but the partisan divisions cut at a similar rate. Of the sample from the 2008 National Asian American Survey, 68 percent supported the Democrats and 32 percent supported the Republicans. Among the partisan groups, there were no statistically significant differences in opinion on provision of paths to citizenship (averages leaning toward the disagree side) or giving priorities to potential immigrants with professional qualifications (averages leaning toward the agree side).

Although Latino voters make up less than ten percent of all voters nationally (Lopez 2012), the expected demographic shifts have prompted Republicans to turn their attention toward this growing group over the past decade. Nationally, Democratic presidential candidates have received at least two-thirds of all Hispanic votes since the 1990s; as a notable exception, George Bush won about forty percent of Latino voters in 2004. The Latino vote was not considered pivotal in 2012 for Barack Obama; Kopicki and Irving (2012) say that even an almost complete transfer of Latino voters to Romney would not have ensured his victory in important swing states.

The major concern for Republicans is Texas, where, were Latino voters to continue shifting toward the Democrats, the electoral votes could eventually swing to the Democrats. Given the other large Democratic states (such as California and New York), it would be all-but impossible for Republicans to ever win the presidency if they lost Texas’ electoral votes. Republicans have tried to attract Latino voters by appealing to their perceived social conservatism – though recent polls suggest this conservatism mainly comes from abortion, not issues like gay marriage (see Taylor et al. 2012) – and “entrepreneurial spirit” (de la Garza & Cortina 2007: 203). During George Bush’s presidency, support for Republicans among Latinos reached all-time highs, perhaps in no small part to his support for guest worker policies.

United Kingdom
As elsewhere in Western Europe, Muslim immigrants tend to be a primary group on which public attention focuses in the United Kingdom. This is not to say that immigrants from India and Pakistan – the two largest sending countries (BBC News 2005) – as well as other less-developed countries are exempt from public concern. In 2001, there were 4.3 million British residents who were born outside the UK, representing 7.5 percent of the total population at the time (57.1 million), and about 22 percent of the foreign-born residents came from India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. The numbers of foreign-born residents from traditionally Muslim countries, such as Turkey, doubled from 1991 to 2001 (BBC News 2005).

Although one-quarter of the UK’s foreign-born population resides in London, and in the 2004-10 period, as many as 35 percent of London residents were not born in the UK, residents of London were actually less likely than residents of other regions of the country to say there were “too many” immigrants in the country. Nationally, 59.4 percent of British respondents said there were too many immigrants (31.7 said “a lot but not too many”), though only 45.2 percent of London residents said so (Transatlantic Trends 2010). More than eighty percent of residents of North East England felt there were too many immigrants, despite immigrants making up less than five percent of the residents of that region (UK ONS 2012: 11).

British ethnic minorities are less likely to support the Conservatives than are American minority groups to support the Republicans. In 1997, about 71 percent of the ethnic minority group members surveyed supported Labour, 10 percent Conservatives, and 4 percent Liberal Democrats. By 2010, support for Labour had dropped to around 58 percent, with support for the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats both around 10 percent (BES Ethnic Minority Survey 1997, 2010). In 2010, immigration was the third-most important issue among the BES ethnic minority respondents, with 7.8 percent listing it as their top priority (24.8 percent said unemployment, and 23.2 percent said the economy). About 43 percent of these respondents disagreed with the proposition that immigrants increase crime rates, and 62 percent felt immigrants are generally good for the British economy. Britain’s ethnic minority population is generally opposed to immigration than the population as a whole, which, in 2008, felt immigrants took jobs from British citizens (55 percent agreeing) and was divided on whether immigrants increase crime rates, with 47.6 percent saying yes (European Values Survey 2008).

Immigrants’ tendency to support left-wing parties in both the US and the UK likely comes from these groups’ perception of the Democrats and the Labour Party as supporting economic and social policies from which they are likely to benefit.2 The right’s perception as being opposed to immigration – whether or not, in the American case, this is actually the party’s stance – takes voting for the right off the table for many naturalized immigrants and the relatives of immigrants born in the US or the UK. Researchers have recently picked up the question of when (and why) political parties in Europe try to attract immigrant voters, but this subset of the literature is early-stage, so no solid conclusions have yet been reached.

Causally, it is difficult to know whether the British Conservatives decided not to pursue naturalized immigrants’ votes because these voters were already strongly pro-Labour, thus making the Conservatives less likely to expend the resources necessary to attract them, or whether the Conservatives have lost possible inroads into this set of voters because the party was viewed as not interested in attracting their votes. What we can say is that naturalized voters in the UK turn out at rates equal to those of native-born voters (71.8 percent for native and 71.9 percent for naturalized, when asked between 2002-08 whether they voted in the last election). In contrast, the native voting

---

2 See, however, Dancygier and Saunders (2006: 973), who say immigrants and natives in the UK hold reasonably similar opinions on economic policies, concluding that something besides policy preferences drives immigrant support for Labour, much like African American support for the Democrats in the US.

Limitations/challenges

The non-publicly available NIS dataset had questions I had hoped to use for my project, which then had to be re-worked when I was not able to get this data.

Policy recommendations

In Western Europe, right-wing parties (as well as mainstream left parties) face pressure from far-right parties that can lead them to be tough on immigration. For the subset of US voters for whom immigration is a key issue, and who are opposed to immigration, even if they are dissatisfied with the direction of the Republican Party, they are unlikely to show this dissatisfaction by voting for the Democrats. If these people lived in most Western European countries, they could express their opinions by voting for the far-right party in their respective country. In the US, a third option has not traditionally been available.

Since the emergence of the various Tea Party movements, however, the possibility of voting for a candidate seen as more steadfastly conservative – whether or not that person was actually committed to restricting immigration – has also emerged. These conservative candidates have also caused some moderate, pro-business Republicans to flip on immigration; this was the case in the 2010 California gubernatorial primary, when Meg Whitman moved from a George Bush-style stance on immigration to something reminiscent of Pete Wilson. Her motivation came from Tea Party challenger Steve Poizner, whose emphasis on illegal immigration led Whitman to take a sharp rightward turn on the issue.

The current climate of elite polarization, particularly given the degree to which Republican members of Congress have shifted rightward, means immigration policies are unlikely to change in either direction. The status of public opinion about immigration in the US is, at present, somewhat confusing – majorities both favor Arizona’s immigration provision upheld by the Supreme Court and clemency toward children brought to the US illegally. The ability for elite cues to sway opinion suggest that, in the absence of a strong right-leaning Republican element, public opinion might move in a more liberal direction, allowing for the passage of legislation like the DREAM Act.

What, then, is to be done to break the stalemate? Given the strategic incentives of politicians, it is unlikely that remaining in favor of easing restrictions on immigration – when the expected cost of this decision is a lost election – will win favor among Republican candidates for office. Yet, Republican losses, particularly in traditionally safe seats, stemming from the juxtaposition of a Democratic candidate and a Tea Party candidate on the ballot may prompt the

4 On elite cues generally, see Zaller (1992); on the Supreme Court and the immigration decision, see Linos and Twist (2012).
party to massively overhaul its strategy, as many observers have already called on them to do (e.g. Krauthammer 2012).

In the meantime, the policy recommendations depend on the desired outcome. Many Americans have already begun to move toward a less hostile position on immigration, possibly as a result of over-time experiences. In some pockets of the country, however, changing minds would not be an easy task. People feel both economically and culturally threatened by large influxes of immigrants in areas that traditionally received few immigrants. Although many of the recent immigrants in the New Immigrant Survey indicate their efforts to integrate into US society (by working, learning English, and the like), this is not the dominant impression of immigrants in the US. Until those perceptions change, perhaps dampening the desire to have anti-immigration candidates, or until the anti-immigration candidates lead to a sort of internal Republican implosion, the status quo is likely to remain.

With respect to the NIS, future waves of the survey would be greatly enhanced by the inclusion of more political questions. The current data set is more usable by sociologists than political scientists, which is unfortunate, given the potential interest it holds for the latter. Questions on political participation (voting, party support, and so on) as well as opinion questions on political issues would make the NIS a rich source of information for scholars interested in the political implications of immigration.

Next steps in research

First, I would like to better understand what has led to the importance of immigration in the United Kingdom and the slight liberalization of opinion in the United States. Neither of these topics is particularly well studied at present. Second, I would like to work with the growing literature on state immigration laws to understand how they come about and what impact they have (be it substantive or symbolic). An overarching goal of mine is to bridge literatures involving the US and Western Europe, areas that share many commonalities when it comes to immigration. I believe scholars and policy makers in each region can learn from the other.

Works cited


Survey data (see ICPSR and GESIS repositories)

British Election Study (Ethnic Minorities Module) 1997, 2010
Latino National Survey 2006
National Asian American Survey 2008